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Abstract  
This paper examines statistical data on the employment of women in the British armed 
forces.  It reviews some of the issues shaping debates about women’s military employment, 
in order to establish the on-going significance of the topic.  It looks at patterns of female 
military employment across the three services, and places discussion of this in the context of 
observations about gendered divisions of labour in the wider UK labour market.  It examines 
data for the gendered divisions of labour within different corps, branches and occupational 
groups within each of the three armed services, and looks at gender patterns across ranks.  It 
concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for both policy and conceptual 
work on women’s military participation.   
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Gendered divisions of military labour in the British armed forces. 
Simple statistics, complex stories 
This is a paper about the complex stories that lie behind a simple statistic.  The simple 
statistic is that which shows the percentage of women’s military participation over the 
previous decade.  The complex stories are those which explain differential levels of women’s 
military participation in the contemporary British armed forces.  In 2005, women comprised 
9.0% of the UK Regular armed forces (HCDC 2006).  A decade later, at the start of 2015, 
that figure had crept up to 10.1% (MOD 2015).  This proportion of around 10% is notable 
because it is small, because it is fairly consistent across time (reviews of defence statistics 
show its very gradual increase and the 2005 to 2015 comparison does not mask any dramatic 
increases or decreases), and because behind it lie a host of additional statistics about women’s 
military participation, analysis of which indicates more nuanced stories about women’s 
uneven participation in the military labour market.  In this paper we contribute to an on-going 
debate about women’s military labour by examining the statistical evidence to show the detail 
of this uneven participation, arguing that analysis at this level is useful to practical and 
conceptual arguments about the actual and potential contribution of women to military forces.   
The paper is structured in three sections.  First, we explain why rates of women’s military 
participation merit attention, and to whom.  We review some of the key issues shaping the 
debate on women’s military employment in the UK from the perspectives of defence policy-
makers and military command, and scholars of military and security issues including feminist 
scholars working across the social sciences.  Second, we look at patterns of women’s military 
participation in different occupations within each of the three UK armed services (British 
Army, Royal Air Force (RAF) and the Royal Navy / Naval Service) over the past twenty 
years, including data on rank progression of women personnel.  We suggest how observed 
trends compare with trends in the broader national labour market, and explore how the 
structuring of women’s labour market participation in the civilian world is reflected in 
gendered divisions of military labour.  Third, we discuss what these patterns of participation 
might imply both for future defence personnel policy at a time of military transformation, and 
for feminist debates about women’s military participation, arguing that these debates are 
incomplete without an assessment of that participation as a form of labour market structuring. 
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Why women’s military employment matters 
Given that the proportion of women employed in the UK Regular armed forces has basically 
remained static over the past decade, it could be suggested that there is little of interest here 
to comment upon and explore.  This is not our view.  The question of rates of women’s 
military participation merits attention for three reasons.   
First, women’s military participation merits close examination because the issue is of 
perennial interest within public and academic debates about military affairs.  Enhancing that 
public debate with informed comment is partly about making visible the patterns and 
practices which make up the statistic of 10%.  Much media commentary on gender in UK 
armed forces cites the 10% figure and leaves the question of women’s differential 
participation within military labour markets unexplored.  In parallel, much analytic academic 
commentary on gender in UK military forces moves swiftly on from an acknowledgement of 
the 10% statistic, using more qualitative data to examine the experiential, political and 
cultural manifestations of a division of labour which is frequently taken as monolithic across 
the armed forces (and we would include our own work here: see for example Woodward and 
Winter 2004, 2006, 2007; Duncanson 2009, 2013; Cornish and Duncanson 2012; Duncanson 
and Woodward 2016).  Yet, as we argue in this paper, if we go back to that figure of 10% and 
start asking how that average is comprised and what disaggregation of that average reveals, a 
more complex and nuanced picture emerges which mirrors broader social trends in terms of 
women’s labour market participation.  In turn, as we show, this prompts new questions about 
the military labour market and women’s place therein.  For example, it shifts focus away 
from issues which so often dominate news media headlines (and indeed academic work), 
such as the viability of women’s close combat participation, or the construction of gendered 
military identities and performances.  Although these are of course significant, they are only 
part of a much wider picture – sometimes even a distraction.  Although discussing women’s 
military participation in labour market terms may not have the allure of more titillating media 
headlines about sexual transgression, or the excitement of finding new conceptual ways of 
understanding the performative enactment of military gendered identities, at root women’s 
military participation is a question of work, of labour markets and of participation therein.  
Given that labour markets are gendered (for an overview, see Mills, 2016), we argue that 
understanding women’s military participation through the gendered labour market is both 
interesting in and of itself, and necessary for a more informed understanding of that 
participation.   
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Second, women’s military participation is a significant policy issue.  It matters to government 
and defence planners because in order to function effectively, military forces need to have 
what they perceive to be the right combination of the right people, with the rights skills, 
doing the right job in the right place at the right time.  This in turn relies on complex 
processes of recruitment, selection, training, personnel management, deployment and 
retention.  Personnel issues faced by defence planners at the present time include the 
practicalities of pinch-points and skills gaps (HCDC 2014), recruitment shortfalls and 
overstretch (HCCPA 2014), and responses to the challenges of budget restrictions limiting 
numbers of personnel employed on a full-time basis (MoD 2013).  They also include more 
strategic questions around the evaluation of security threats and trends at more global levels 
over longer timescales and the implications of this for manning strategies (DCDC 2014, MoD 
2015).  These challenges require carefully planning and management of military personnel to 
ensure that military forces have a workforce in place appropriate to the tasks expected of it by 
government and civil society.   Needless to say, we would argue that these processes of 
planning and management are gendered in that they are social processes through which 
gender is constituted and expressed.   
Gender is significant to personnel management and thus to wider strategic issues because 
women provide a source of labour power.  As has so often been the case across military 
forces (see Carreiras 2006; Carreiras and Kümmel 2008; Segal, 1986, 1995), the British 
armed forces have drawn on female labour power when they have needed it, for example in 
times of national emergency or when men have been in short supply (Noakes 2006; Dandeker 
and Segal 1996).  Following the restructuring of the UK armed forces under the 1991 Options 
for Change programme which included the disbanding of women-only units and the 
incorporation of all personnel together, the 1990s saw the expansion of roles open to women 
(for example, in the Royal Artillery (RA), Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
(REME) and Royal Engineers (RE)).  There were commentaries at this time about the 
necessity of this move not just in response to wider civil society and government pressures 
for employment equity, or because of the relative shrinkage of more traditional recruitment 
pools to the armed forces (white, male, working class labour), but also because of the 
demands upon the UK armed forces at that time in the 1990s in terms of peace-keeping and 
peace-support roles and arguments about the soldiering skills required by these roles, which 
might include skills held by both men and women (de Groot, 2001).  
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The UK was not alone here.  Since the mid 1970s and early 1980s, all NATO member states, 
bar Iceland (which does not have a standing armed forces), have passed legislation 
permanently integrating women into their ranks, as demands for labour power and equal 
opportunities legislation have taken hold (Obradovic, 2014).  The number of women in 
NATO militaries and the extent of their service rose dramatically, from 30,000 in 1961 to 
300,000 in 2001 (Obradovic 2014: 1).  There is some variation within NATO of course.  The 
United States and Canada have long had relatively large proportions of women in their ranks 
– around 15%.  The newer NATO states present a slightly different picture of a relatively 
recent but more dramatic rise.  For example, the percentage of women in Hungary’s military 
rose from 6.8% in 2000 to 20% in 2012 (Obradovic 2014: 53).  Yet it is also clear that all 
NATO states have experienced an increase in the number of women, and that the roles they 
play are similarly expanding (Obradovic 2014).   
 
Gender has continued to be of policy significance to UK defence planners during the long 
period of conflict starting with British contributions to coalition responses to the 9/11 attacks 
and including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  British personnel deployments included the 
deployment of women, of course, and there are indications that these deployments 
contributed quite markedly to the normalisation of women’s military participation.  This is 
based on growing evidence that women have, quite simply, been able to do the jobs for which 
they have been trained, working alongside men.  They have done so because they are 
competent, capable employees.  As Anthony King (2013) notes, judgements of the 
performance of women personnel on active operations in Afghanistan by British soldiers 
have commended the professional competence of a great many deployed women.  Although 
there has yet to be a comprehensive assessment of women’s specific contribution to the 
British deployments in Afghanistan, anecdotal evidence suggests not only competent 
performance but also the sense of normality their presence brought to otherwise all-male 
units in situations which were anything but normal (see Bury 2010, Taylor 2011).  Although 
false expectations and the challenging context undermines claims that Female Engagement 
Teams (FETs) were a success in Afghanistan, British military women working in FETs have 
been identified as making some important contributions to work with Afghan civilians, 
especially women, in order to build security (Azarbaijani-Moghaddan 2014).   
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Anecdotal evidence also suggests that generational changes in attitudes to gender roles are 
playing a role in the declining resistance to women’s military employment within the armed 
forces.  At the same time, however, levels of reported sexual harassment and bullying are still 
unacceptably high, with the 2014 Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey finding that 
10% believed themselves to have been the subject of discrimination, harassment or bullying 
in a Service environment in the previous 12 months (MoD 2014a).1  Furthermore, there is 
some evidence of the ‘token effect’ (see Carreiras (2006), following Kanter (1977) and Yoder 
(1991)) playing out for women in the British military, with the attendant issues of heightened 
visibility of a small minority, exaggeration of differences and exclusion, and assimilation to 
organisational (masculinist) norms (King 2013; Roohan 2013).  As with most militaries, 
comprehensive evidence of the extent to which women are accepted and the difference 
women make to the British Armed Forces is lacking.  But in order to begin to establish this, it 
is instructive to explore exactly where military women are employed, not least because as we 
have discussed, gender is a significant factor in military personnel policy. 
The continued policy significance of gendered divisions of labour to UK armed forces, is also 
evident through the proposed lifting of the exclusion of women from direct combat roles.  
Posts in the Household Cavalry, the Royal Armoured Corps, the Infantry, the Royal Marines 
General Service and the RAF Regiment have remained closed to women, although there are 
strong indications that this ban will be formally lifted in 2016 (MOD 2014b, Fitriani et al 
2016).  What is significant here is less the lifting of these exclusions, which are in many ways 
symbolic – and we discuss this point in our conclusion as patterns of women’s military 
participation speak directly to this (see also MacKenzie 2015).  Rather, what is significant is 
the language used to frame this debate by defence policy-makers.  For example, in urging the 
Government to review the combat exclusion for women in 2013 following policy changes in 
the US armed forces, the UK’s Shadow Defence Secretary did so on the grounds that ‘We in 
Britain must maximise everyone’s talent and courage for our military’ (cited in Haynes 2013, 
17), an argument echoing that of  Brigadier Nicky Moffat2, the British Army’s most senior 
female soldier until her retirement in 2012.  Personnel debates, in other words, are about 
                                                          
1 Note that this survey does not distinguish between gender-based discrimination, harassment or bullying and 
such activities rooted in other forms of social discrimination.   
2 Brigadier Moffat was speaking in the context of the US lifting of the combat exclusion for women, noting that 
‘The [US] policy change will, in my view, ensure that a wider pool of talent is available to maintain a capable 
and operationally-relevant force, fit to meet the challenges of 21st century warfare. It will also remove bars to 
employment and progression which, hitherto, will have held women back from competing for more senior 
roles.’ http://www.channel4.com/news/women-served-in-male-only-british-ta-combat-roles   
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military forces having what they perceive to be the right combination of skills and talents to 
meet the challenges of contemporary conflicts and deployments and about what 
policymakers, the defence community, government and civil society want their military 
forces to do and be.  Gender is central to this recognition of the benefits of diversity3 (Acker 
1992; Britton 2000; Carreiras 2006; Woodward and Winter 2006). 
Third, looking closely at women’s military employment and patterns of the gendered division 
of labour is of significance because of what conclusions might bring to feminist political and 
conceptual debates about gender and the military, and about gender equality more broadly.  
As we have already noted, the development of peace-keeping roles in the 1990s in, for 
example, the Balkans shifted arguments towards assessments of the specific utility of female 
labour in such roles.  Indeed, the Army recruitment campaigns of the late 1990s and early 
2000s reflect this very clearly (Woodward and Winter 2007).  Yet the idea that women may 
have particular skills is a contentious one, because it risks an essentialising discourse which 
can ultimately disadvantage women by constructing them as ‘naturally’ having a specific set 
of attributes (see Jennings 2011).  Women may be expected to offer diversity and such 
expectations can be problematic (Kronsell 2012), an issue noted around the use of Female 
Engagement Teams in Afghanistan (McBride and Wibben 2012).  Women’s inclusion may 
also serve ideological purposes such as a signifier for ‘modernization’ in Gaddafi’s Libya or 
the demonstration of ‘white political unity’ in apartheid South Africa (Mathers 2013: 132, 
134). At the same time, women’s inclusion opens up the possibility for the valorisation of 
skills which may previously have been disparaged as ‘feminine’, and thus disrupts and shakes 
up gendered dichotomies in ways which may be very beneficial both for gender equality and 
for peace-building (see Duncanson and Woodward 2016).  This is a reminder that just as the 
debates on women’s military participation matter in very practical ways to those responsible 
for the deployment of armed forces, they matter also to those interested in whether women’s 
military participation represents progress towards feminist goals or the co-option of 
feminism, and to those interested in the wider social meanings and effects of military forces 
with regard to gender relations.4 
There is something very specific, however, about the contribution that a close attention to 
gendered divisions of labour can make to feminist conceptual and political debate.  Militaries 
                                                          
3 Note also the parallels and discontinuities with policies on ethnic diversity (see Ware, 2012).   
4 For a range of viewpoints on this issue, see contributions to Woodward and Duncanson (forthcoming).   
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are male dominated numerically, especially in sectors mostly closely related to their core 
functions, and those that confer greater prestige and rewards, and more chance of promotion.   
There are a number of core areas of feminist inquiry which follow the effects of patterns of 
numerical domination or exclusion, including the domination of masculinist cultures and 
ideologies (Cockburn 2007, Enloe 2007), the potentially negative consequences of that for 
the facilitation of peace and security (Whitworth 2004), or the possibilities of transformation 
and stasis through the inclusion of women (Carreiras 2006, Herbert 1998, D’Amico and 
Weinstein 1999, Woodward and Winter 2007, Basham 2013, Roohan 2013).  What close 
attention to the basic patterns of the gendered division of labour enables is a more nuanced 
and detailed understanding of the institutional spread of women, tackling the idea of ‘the 
military’ as somehow monolithic in its gendered form, and enabling a more informed 
conceptual debate to take place.   
 
Clearly, then, to a range of different interest groups in policy and academic circles, the 
question of women’s military employment matters greatly, often for very different reasons, 
and there remain a number of unresolved and conflicting issues around both the practices of 
women’s inclusion, and their implications.  This paper does not set out to resolve all of the 
wider contextual and political arguments which circulate around women’s military 
employment.  Rather, our intention is to add to these debates by exploring a facet of this 
which has hitherto received little attention in British contexts.  This concerns the patterns of 
women’s employment in the armed forces and the comparisons and inferences which we can 
draw about current trends and future changes on the basis of these patterns for an armed 
forces in a state of transformation, and in ways which contribute to arguments about the 
purposes of military forces.  We use the term ‘the gendered division of labour’ to refer to this 
complex and differential structuring of women’s military employment, to signal that work in 
the armed forces is unevenly structured by gender.  It is our contention that by looking 
beyond the basic statistic of 10% and disaggregating it across the three services and between 
occupations within those services to establish more precisely the patterns of this gendered 
division of military labour, we can contribute to a more nuanced set of interventions into 
debates about women’s military participation.  
 
Unpacking the 10%: patterns in women’s military employment 
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It is, we hope, self-evident that the figure of 10.1% (as it currently stands) is of limited utility 
when actually explaining anything to do with women’s military employment in the UK 
context; it shows merely an overall aggregated proportion for the armed forces as a whole 
and it says little about its underlying reasons.  In what follows we disaggregate this single 
statistic in order to show what the present gendered division of military labour looks like in 
more detail, and to provide some suggestions as to why it looks like it does.   
The figures that we use are drawn directly from, or are calculated from, National Statistics 
publications for the MOD in the quarterly and annual personnel reports, which are publically 
available documents.  In addition, we draw on data provided by MOD Defence Statistics (Tri-
Service)  in response to a direct inquiry made in October 2013 requesting data on the 
numbers and proportion of women, disaggregated by rank, for the British Army, the Royal 
Air Force (RAF) and the Naval Service, at specific points in time.5   
Table 1 shows the figure of 9.9% for the proportion of armed forces personnel who were 
women as of 1st April 2014, disaggregated by service and rank, and compares this against the 
same statistic for the previous four years.6  Note that overall, employment across all three 
services fell from 191,710 on 1st April 2010, to 159,630 on 1st April 2014; the figures shown 
indicate the proportion of that overall number of employees who were women.  Framing the 
discussion which follows, therefore, is the fact that the overall number of people employed in 
the armed forces continues to fall year on year, reflecting both current tranches of redundancy 
and longer-term reductions in personnel numbers.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 1 shows how the proportion of women employed in the three services has increased 
year on year from 2010.  The exception to the overall increase is the Naval Service, where an 
overall decrease is accounted for by a decrease of 0.8 percentage points amongst Other 
Ranks.  The figures in Table 1 show clear differences between the three services, with the 
greatest increase being 0.9 percentage points amongst RAF officers.  However, although 
there has been an increase in the proportion of women RAF officers, there was in fact a 
                                                          
5 This data is Unrestricted, but does not exist in published form at the present time as far as we are aware.  In 
accordance with academic protocols for data transparency, a copy of the data set is available from the authors 
on request. 
6 We use the data for 1st April for consecutive years; data for April 2015 was not available at the time of 
writing, hence the use of 1st April 1014 figure as the last point in the time series (9.9%), rather than the figure 
of 10.1% given above (1st January 2015). 
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decrease in the actual number of women RAF officers, as noted above, from 1,510 in 2010 to 
1,290 in 2013.  The figures in Table 1 also show quite clearly the differences between 
Officers and Other Ranks in terms of the proportions of women personnel in each. The 
Officer class clearly attracts higher proportions of women than Other Ranks across the three 
services.  We can see that the changes taking place, albeit small for all three services, are 
happening at different speeds and in different ways.  The key point we can infer from this 
table is that the three services offer different employment opportunities and environments for 
their personnel, reflecting their specific roles within defence and thus their personnel 
requirements.  It is a basic but fundamental point: the military labour market, as with all 
labour markets, is differentiated and structured in various ways around roles, skills and 
capability requirements, status and remuneration, and there will always be gender 
differentials at play here.   
 
Comparisons with the civilian labour market 
For the purposes of comparison with Table 1 and subsequent tables, Table 2 shows for the 
UK labour market as a whole the percentage of men and women working in each of the nine 
major occupation groups used by the Office for National Statistics.  These standardised 
occupational classifications are developed from the national Labour Force Survey to provide 
data on the socio-demographics of the UK workforce, and provide a basic indication of the 
gendered divisions of labour nationally.   
[Table 2 about here] 
There are two points to make here.  The first, quite obviously, follows from the clear 
disparities between men and women in different occupational groups, with the much higher 
proportions of men in ‘Managers and senior officials’, ‘Skilled trades and occupations’ and 
‘Process, plant and machine operatives’.  Women dominate in ‘Administrative and secretarial 
occupations’, ‘Caring, leisure and other service occupations’ and ‘Sales and other customer 
service occupations’.  Note also that labour market segregation patterns remain quite constant 
over time; although Table 2 shows only a snap-shot for 2013, other studies confirm that 
whilst women’s overall participation in the labour market has increased over the last four 
decades, gendered divisions by occupational category remain consistent (see ONS 2003, 
ITUC 2008).  The question to consider is whether the armed forces as a whole mirror a wider 
gendered division of labour.  Although it is very difficult to make direct comparisons 
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between military and civilian jobs7, it is useful to consider how the skills and personal 
attributes required of different military occupations might correspond to a nearest civilian 
equivalent.   
The second point to note is the pay and status differences between and within these groups.  
Men dominate in occupational groups associated with higher levels of pay, such as 
‘Managers and senior officials’ where they make up 66.9% of the total.  The apparent 
equality implied in the ‘Professional occupations’ category (which is the most common 
occupational category for both men and women, at 19% and 21% respectively – see ONS 
2013b), is slightly misleading, as within this professional category, men and women are 
unevenly distributed over a wide variety of jobs.  For example, the most common occupation 
for women was nursing while the most common for men was programmers and software 
development.  In other words, men tend to dominate in professional occupations associated 
with higher levels of pay (nurses earn on average £16.61 per hour, whilst programmers and 
software developers earn £20.02 (ASHE 2012)).  It is widely recognised that women are 
more likely to be found in the low paid ‘five Cs’ of cleaning, catering, clerical, cashiering 
(retail), and caring work (Perrons 2009).  This is significant for gendered divisions of military 
labour, because it indicates how even apparent equalities in broad statistics can mask status 
differences.   
In the data which follows, we are able to see a more fine-grained disaggregation which more 
accurately describes the jobs that military women do, and Table 2 provides a useful schema 
for understanding how the gendered divisions of military labour which we discuss below 
replicate or diverge from gendered divisions of labour in the national labour market.   
 
British Army  
When we break down the statistics on the proportion of women in each service into their 
component job specialisations so that intra-service differences become evident, we see the 
gendered divisions of military labour in a much more nuanced way.  Table 3 shows the 
proportion of women employed in the different arms and corps of the British Army at 5-year 
                                                          
7 Direct comparisons are difficult as there are no civilian equivalents of many military occupations. To 
complicate things further, the Standard Occupational Classification system allocates military personnel to one 
of two possible categories (depending on whether they are Officers or Other Ranks).  Nonetheless, we feel it is 
worthwhile trying to illuminate the patterns of military employment by reference to the civilian labour market 
because it is the only way to gain a sense of the distinctiveness (or not) of the pattern of women’s 
employment in the military.  
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intervals from 1998.  It is important to note that data for the Infantry, the Household Cavalry 
and Royal Armoured Corps, the Royal Army Chaplain’s Department, the Small Arms School 
Corps and those in Senior Soldier Continuity Posts have been excluded, as the data on these 
groups contains no women.  If it were included, the picture would look less inclusive of 
women. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Trends over time in the gendered division of labour 
We have chosen 1998 as the start point for this series, because it marks the most recent 
significant point of change in gender integration, when the Royal Artillery (RA), Royal 
Engineers (RE) and Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) became open to 
women.  We can infer from this data the following points.  The rise in the proportion of 
women in staff roles mirrors a wider change in UK labour markets with the gradual and long-
term advance of women to senior managerial roles.  A crude indicator of this from wider 
labour market data shows a rise from 31% of women in managerial positions in 2001 to 33% 
in 2013 (ONS 2001; ONS 2013b).  The rate of the rise of the proportion of women in staff 
roles (from 1.4% in 1996 to 5.6% in 2013) has thus been faster than the rise of women into 
management in civilian sphere in the last decade, but with women in only 5.6% of senior 
positions, the gap between men and women at senior levels remains much more stark in the 
British Army.  In the RA, RE, REME and the Army Air Corps (AAC), the proportion of 
women is small, has grown, but is still below the average for the Army as a whole.  Again, 
this mirrors a pattern in the wider UK labour market, where if we think in terms of the nearest 
civilian equivalent jobs, we see much smaller proportions of women in technical, engineering 
and construction roles associated with ‘Skilled trades occupations’ (see Table 2).   
In the corps where women have longer histories of employment or association – Royal 
Signals (R Signals), Royal Logistics Corps (RLC) and the Intelligence Corps – there has been 
stasis or decline.  We have no immediate explanation for this.  It is possible that women 
wanting to pursue careers in these jobs which use skills and aptitudes in nearest equivalent 
fields to communications, logistics, etc., are looking to pursue them as civilians, rather than 
in military contexts with lower pay and more rigidly defined working conditions.  It is also 
possible that whilst there has been some expansion of job opportunities in these corps, 
women in or considering joining the British Army are showing little interest in taking these 
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specific roles, electing to join other corps and take other roles instead.  It may also be the case 
that as the role of intelligence is regarded as increasingly important in the multidimensional 
operations of the post 9/11 era, it has become redefined as a more prestigious corps, has 
attracted more men and become, in effect, masculininsed.  The way in which social tasks 
become ‘sex-typed’ (assigned as work suitable either for men or for women) is a familiar 
phenomenon to feminist scholars (Cockburn 1983, 1989, 1991; Acker 1992; Bradley 2007).  
Noting the way in which ‘when women have performed similar tasks to men on the 
production line, what counted as natural aptitude and dexterity for women (nature) has often 
been interpreted as trained skills for men (culture), with pay and conditions of work 
following accordingly’, Charlotte Hooper concludes that ‘It is not the actions themselves but 
the gendered interpretations placed on them that are crucial in determining which activities 
count as masculine and valued and which count as feminine and devalued’ (Hooper 2001, 47-
8).   
In the other sector where military women have long histories of employment, medical and 
related roles, there has been an increase in the proportion of women working in the RAMC as 
medical professionals and a decrease in those occupying nursing roles, seen in the QARANC 
becoming less female-dominated.  This is mirrored to some extent in the wider civilian labour 
market with the increase in the proportion of men pursuing careers in nursing and related 
health-care roles (although the proportion of men working as nursing is only around 10% at 
present) and an increase in women working as doctors from 40% to 45% (ONS 2001; ONS 
2013a).  There is a significant increase in the proportion of Army dental and veterinarian staff 
who are women, which mirrors a similar rise in the proportion of women in these professions 
in the civilian labour market (ONS 2001; 2013).  
In the AGC, where women have traditionally worked in much larger numbers since the First 
World War, there is a marked increase in the proportion of women from one quarter to one 
third.  This mirrors the expansion of female employment in the civilian labour market in 
equivalent administrative, organisational and managerial jobs.  This is difficult to evidence 
simply, as re-categorisation of jobs has affected the counts of men and women in 
administrative and secretarial roles, but note how women comprise 76.6% within 
‘Administrative and secretarial’ occupations in 2013 (Table 2).  Indeed, although we show 
aggregated figures for AGC here, data for 2013 which disaggregates this Corps still further 
shows 20% of those in the AGC Provosts branch are women, 38.9% in Staff and Personnel 
Support, 45% in Education and Training Services and 41.6% in Army Legal Services, adding 
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further detail to the picture of gendered divisions of military labour which seem to mirror the 
wider labour market.    
The General Service Corps / General List, which includes individuals under training, shows a 
very uneven pattern in the proportion of women officer cadets. This could be an example of 
the dynamic nature of the relationship between the civilian and military labour markets in 
graduate recruitment, where variations in the health of the graduate labour market over time 
are in turn reflected in differences in the attractiveness or otherwise of an Army career for 
women graduates (Segal 1995; Carreiras 2006).   
Overall, the figures in the table confirm what many within the British Army have noted 
anecdotally to us; that whilst women, in electing to pursue a career in the British Army, are 
choosing to enter what is widely perceived to be a non-traditional occupation and sector for 
female employment, once in the Army, have tended to be employed in roles which in their 
civilian labour market equivalent have tended to be commonly understood as ‘female’  This 
pattern has also been noted in existing research in other national contexts, Israel for example 
(Sasson-Levy and Amram-Katz 2007; Sasson-Levy, 2003, 2007).  Carrieras (2006) cites 
evidence from the Czech Republic and Belgium which indicates that women have chosen 
jobs which have traditionally been defined as feminine, rather than being prevented from 
choosing others through discrimination, but that information only gets us so far, as we do not 
know the many factors which have gone into that decision.  There is also evidence that 
gendered divisions of military labour are also shaped by the influence of ideas of 
masculinities (see for example Hale 2012, Brown 2012).  Understanding with precision the 
reasons for the gendered divisions of military labour evident in Table 3 clearly requires more 
focused research on Army women’s career choices and motivations.  The effects of 
discrimination, the gendering of educational pathways pre-recruitment, the cultural and social 
influences on individual women as they determine their career choice, the comparability or 
otherwise between military work and the demands of family life, and the availability of jobs 
wherein women have been able to develop career pathways, will all be factors.  These 
possible explanations are not mutually exclusive of course, and will interact in order to 
influence the gendered division of labour within militaries. Given current concerns within the 
British Army about the continued low levels of recruitment of women, we suggest the detail 
of differential recruitment and retention to the different corps and services is helpful in 
understanding where exactly patterns of over- and under-representation lie.  In research 
terms, these patterns of differential engagement suggest not only that the reasons behind 
15 
 
differential participation as articulated by women within the British Army merit continued 
scrutiny, but also suggest that transformations in military roles over time may be a significant 
component in feminist debates about women’s military participation. 
 
The dynamics of generation and rank 
We also drew on available data to consider how women’s participation within different arms 
and corps has changed over time in terms of career progression.  Because of the rank 
structure of the armed forces, comparisons over time have been straightforward to calculate.8  
For reasons of space we only do this for two corps – the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers.  
We chose these because they had no prior history before 1998 of direct female employment 
and are in certain respects very non-traditional areas for women’s military participation.  
However as Table 3 shows, they have developed quite different gender profiles since 1998. 
Each illustrates points relevant to the broader analysis of women’s military employment.  
Table 4 charts the changing proportions of women at different ranks within the Royal 
Artillery from 1998 to 2013, and shows quite clearly gradual progression in the proportions 
of women at each stage of promotion. 
[Table 4 about here] 
The table shows the first female Sergeants and first female Majors appearing ten years after 
women first formally enter the Royal Artillery, although in fact data for 2005 not included 
here shows ten of each appearing in 2005 (figure reflects rounding).  By 2013, the first Staff 
Sergeants and WO2s are visible, although ten SSgts appear in the data for 2010, again not 
shown here.  The only slight anomalies are the decline in 2013 in the proportion of female 
subalterns and female Corporals and Lance Corporals.  Crude as the data in Table 4 is, it 
would appear to support an argument that once they are trained and commence their careers 
in the Royal Artillery, there is career progression for women through the ranks.  Whilst the 
numbers at each rank have declined as a result of overall Army personnel reductions, the 
proportions of women relative to men have stayed constant or gradually increased.  Also 
significant, though also not shown in this table, is the proportion of untrained personnel at the 
                                                          
8 We note, however, that there may be various differences between corps in terms of the availability of 
promotion opportunities and the application of promotion criteria, which may affect this data, but which we 
have not been able to allow for.   
16 
 
most junior level who are women.  The data for 2008 and 2013 (the only two years for which 
we have the data) shows these at 9.1% and 17.5% respectively.  We can infer that the Royal 
Artillery is gradually but definitely becoming a career option for women both as Officers and 
as Other Ranks, and it would be worth exploring further the reasons for this. 
Table 5 shows the results of a similar exercise, illustrating the changing proportions of 
women within the Royal Engineers across the ranks from 1998 to 2013. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Again, we see patterns of progression through the ranks across time.  Visible also are two 
other issues.  The first of these is the very small proportion of women in the Royal Engineers 
(RE) as Other Ranks.  Table 3 illustrated the overall small proportion of women in the RE, 
and Table 5 gives some indication of how this plays out.  A simple explanation might have 
something to do with the roles performed by the RE; although there are no direct civilian 
equivalents to combat engineers, the nearest civilian equivalents – the construction industry 
and other trades – similarly have very small proportions of women working in them at the 
lower-status end of the spectrum of manual occupations.  The second issue is what appears to 
be the relative popularity of the RE as a career pathway for women officers.  In addition, and 
not shown here, is the fact that in 2013, 16% of untrained RE officers were women.  
Explanations for this relatively large proportion, compared with other Arms and Corps, may 
lie with the Defence Technical Undergraduate Scheme (DTUS) gradually bearing fruit.  This 
was established to provide specialist degree-level training in primarily engineering and 
related science programmes for those intending to pursue a career in the armed forces at 
officer level, and funds around 100 new entrants per year through generous bursary support.  
It may also reflect a national increase in the number of women graduates from science and 
technology undergraduate programmes more generally.  There may also be initiatives within 
the RE to encourage more women officer applicants.  Again, this points to the need for closer 
investigation of the specifics of different arms and corps in terms of employment practices, in 
order to explain observable patterns.  It may be the case that personnel policies (such as 
DTUS) initiated without explicit regard for their gendered effects can end up having very 
pronounced effects on the gendered division of labour. 
From the data on the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, we infer two things. First, there is 
career progression through the ranks, albeit amongst small numbers of women, and at a slow 
pace.  Second, the jobs where women are increasing fastest as a proportion of the workforce 
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in these two corps are those at officer level, indicating that it is in more senior managerial-
type roles that we see evidence for the enthusiasm for women in these two corps, which both 
remain very male-dominated. 
 
Future Force 2020 and the feminisation of the British Army 
Overall, what is notable in the data on the changing proportions of women across different 
occupations in the British Army is that whilst the overall numbers of people employed has 
fallen, the proportion of women has increased.  In 2010, excluding the Infantry and 
Household Cavalry / Royal Armoured Corps, the British Army employed 75,010 people, and 
11.4% of these were women (7,670).  In 2013, 68,020 people were employed (with the 
exclusion as above) of which 12.3% were women (7,520).  This time period has seen four 
tranches of redundancies under the Armed Forces Redundancy Programme set in motion by 
the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review.  It is evident from the figures we have 
noted already in this paper, from calculations of the proportions of men and women in each 
tranche, and from analysis of the Army trades selected for redundancy where Infantry and 
Royal Engineers form the biggest group, that the implementation of the AFRP has fallen 
disproportionately on soldiers who are men.    
A significant component of the Future Force 2020 programme is the replacement of full-time 
members of the Regular forces with reservists and the greater integration of those reservists 
within the whole force structure.  Although this programme covers all three armed forces, it 
has greatest effect on the British Army which has the most ambitious targets for Reserves 
expansion.  The expansion of the Army Reserve raises some potentially very interesting 
questions around its effect on the proportions of women employed overall.  Table 6 shows the 
number and proportion of women in the Territorial Army9 (Group A) by gender and rank for 
1st April 2013. 
[Table 6 about here] 
Clearly, the proportion of women in the TA / Army Reserve exceeds by some margin the 
proportion in the Army overall, even accounting for the absence in Table 6 of untrained 
                                                          
9The data was classified by Defence Statistics as ‘Territorial Army’ rather than Army Reserve at point of 
delivery.  Group A TA personnel can be deployed.  Group B (Officer Training Corps cadets attending UK 
universities) cannot. 
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personnel.  It would be unwise at this stage in the Future Force 2020 process to predict with 
any degree of certainty the likely changes in the proportions of women as the Army Reserve 
expands.  We can however speculate that this move has the potential for the further increase 
in the proportion of women in the British Army (Regular and Reserves).  There has been no 
research to date of which we are aware, which satisfactorily explains the higher proportion of 
women in the Army Reserve, relative to the Regular army.  Again, this is an area for closer 
investigation.  We suggest that the reasons for this lie with compatibility between Reservist 
roles and civilian employment such that Reservist participation offers a more manageable 
means of pursuing military participation for some women; and with the popularity of 
Reservist participation for former Regulars enabling continuity of participation for women.   
There is a sense in which the Future Force 2020 programme may, potentially, feminise the 
British Army’s labour force in ways that gender-orientated policy interventions have not.    
 
Royal Air Force 
As noted in Table 1, the RAF has a much higher proportion of women employees relative to 
the British Army and the Naval Service.  This has long been recognised, at least anecdotally, 
as reflecting the much higher ratio of support and technical staff to those deployed in direct 
combat roles (i.e. as pilots), and reflecting historic patterns of gendered employment which 
have in the past excluded women from flying roles (although this has now changed).  The 
RAF (again anecdotally) has been seen as a more attractive career choice for women pursuing 
a military career because of an organisational culture which has been more open to accepting 
women’s participation.   Because of changes in the categorisation of RAF personnel between 
2004-2009 and 2009-2013 making direct comparisons across time quite difficult, it is not 
possible to show the changing proportions of women in different branches in one table, so 
this data is shown separately in Tables 7, 8 and 9 which give the proportions of women RAF 
officers in different branches for 2004, 2009 and 2013. 
[Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here] 
Note that the original data for 2013 includes the number in General Duties (GD) together 
with the numbers in ‘Flying’, and note also that the differences between 2009 and 2013 in the 
allocation of staff to ‘GBO (Ground Based Operations)’ and ‘Specialist’ categories give the 
impression of significant changes, which are misleading.  What can be inferred from the table 
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is the difference between branches of the RAF in terms of the proportion of women in each, 
and the obvious increase to 16.2% by 2013 in the total proportion of RAF officers who are 
women.  This is much higher than the Army and Navy, and way above the overall 10% for 
the armed forces as a whole.   
[Table 10 about here] 
Table 10 shows the proportions of women in each RAF Trade Group for Other Ranks, for 
2004, 2009 and 2013.  It is clear that within the mechanical and technical trades, there are far 
lower proportions of women, compared with the much higher proportions in the flight 
operations, intelligence, administrative, catering and medical trades.  As with the Army, there 
is a reduction in the proportion of women in intelligence-related and ICT functions, and again 
we speculate whether this may be explained by the increasing status of these roles.  Also 
notable is the sharp increase in women in physical training instructor roles in the RAF; this 
might be connected to the rise in the number of civilian women at the highest levels of fitness 
(e.g. women's participation rates in ultramarathon have increased six-fold since the 1980s 
(Hanlon 2010)), although this is not replicated in the comparable figures for the Army 
indicating no simple explanation for this rise.   
[Table 11 about here] 
Table 11 shows the distribution of women by rank across the trained strength of the RAF in 
2004, 2009 and 2013.  In contrast to Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10, because all trades and branches 
have been grouped together, comparisons across time are feasible.  Note the very small 
proportion of women in chief technician and senior aircraftman roles – again, reflecting lower 
proportions in technical trades.  What is also significant, however, is that although the overall 
numbers are very small (only 20 in total, a number which may also reflect rounding in the 
original dataset), amongst Officer Designates undertaking training, there is parity in 
proportion between men and women in 2013.  Not shown in this table, but completing the 
picture, is data from Defence Statistics which shows that in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force by 
1st April 2013, women constituted 16.9% of the overall workforce.  Again, we speculate on 
patterns of feminisation of the armed forces under Future Force 2020. 
 
Naval Service 
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The Naval Service includes the Royal Navy, Royal Marines and the Maritime Reserve.  The 
Royal Marines General Service is not open to women, and it was only in 2014 that the first 
women were deployed as submariners so are not included in the data collection for 2013.  
Table 12 shows the proportion of women Officers in the Naval Service by branch, for 2003-
2013, and Table 13 shows the proportion of women Ratings for the same period.   
[Tables 12 and 13 about here] 
Note that the data in Tables 12 and 13 is derived from three separate publications and direct 
comparisons across the years should be made cautiously.  That said, the data has a basic 
utility in showing the distribution of women in the different branches of the Naval Service.  
We see, again, the much smaller proportions of women in Warfare and Engineering branches, 
and the larger proportions in logistics and medical functions.  These broad patterns are 
replicated both for Officers and Ratings.  Although direct comparative data from the nearest 
civilian equivalent is unobtainable, note that for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, which is civilian-
manned, the overall proportion of women is very low but gradually increasing over time – 
3.4% in 2003, 4.6% in 2008 and 6.3% in 2013.   
Table 14 shows the proportion of women at different ranks each year from 2009 to 2013, and 
we include also figures for the Maritime Reserve.  Note the differences between Tables 1 and 
14 for the total proportions for Officers and Ratings for 2013, which reflect differences in raw 
data which we are unable to explain.  Two points can be made about the overall proportions 
of women in the Naval Service.  The first is that, as with the Army and in contrast to the 
RAF, the increases in the proportion of women in the Naval Service have been very slow.  
However, at a time of redundancies and overall contraction in the size of the Naval Service, it 
seems that the redundancy programme (as with the other two services) is not affecting the 
roles where women are present in greater numbers.  The second point is the much higher 
proportion of women in the Maritime Reserve, which includes the Royal Naval Reserve 
(which includes women) and the Royal Marines Reserve (which does not).  Data for just the 
RNR (not included here) shows that the proportion of women who are Leading Rates is 
29.4%.  Again, this is interesting in the context of the proposed expansion of the Reserves 
under the Future Force 2020 programme, with a (possibly unintended) effect of this 
expansion being, as with the Army, the ‘feminisation’ of the RNR.  The higher proportions of 
women in the RNR we presume reflect the shore-based nature of RNR roles.   
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Gendered divisions of military labour: looking forward 
In summary, the data presented in this paper indicates the following.  The proportion of 
women in the armed forces remains low overall, with increases happening very gradually.  
However, between the three services there are visible differences, and within each individual 
service, there are stark differences between different occupations where women are present in 
greater proportions in (broadly defined) administrative, service-related and medical 
occupations.10  The patterns shown in the data reflect similar differences in nearest equivalent 
civilian occupational classifications, where women tend to be concentrated in administrative, 
caring and service occupations.  The gendered division of military labour thus reflects 
patterns of gendered labour in the wider labour market.  There are higher proportions of 
women at more senior levels (i.e. amongst Officers), indicating that in managerial and senior 
administrative functions, there are greater opportunities for employment for women relative 
to Other Ranks.  Again, this reflects patterns across the wider labour market in terms of 
women’s recent small rises in employment in professional and managerial roles.  Overall, 
there are specific niches where far greater proportions of women are located, and explicit 
recognition of this seems to us to be important for those seeking to engage with the multiple 
arguments (practical and conceptual) around women’s military participation, and by 
extension, the relationships between gender and the military.  It is important because if, as 
policy-makers and some feminist academic commentators have suggested, an increase in the 
proportion of women in the armed forces is positive because of consequences for military 
capabilities and for what advanced liberal democracies want their armed forces to be and do, 
then it makes sense to examine how and why an increase in the proportion of women in some 
areas has occurred. 
We have three concluding observations which follow from this, and bring us back to our 
opening comments about the stasis of the 10% figure and the nuances that this conceals.  The 
first is about the significance of personnel policy changes which may directly be targeted at 
increased gender diversity. We could attribute the overall changes in patterns of women’s 
military employment just to broader national labour market shifts over time, with the 
incremental but often quite slow expansion of the pursuit of paid employment by women, 
within labour markets highly structured by gender.  What seems to be significant, though, is 
                                                          
10 The proportions of military musicians who are women may also be significant, given their high levels of 
public visibility because of their public performance roles.   
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the fact that at a time when the overall numbers of military personnel are contracting, the 
proportion of women is maintained.  It is instructive, then, to consider the patterns we have 
discussed in the context of observations about military labour markets from previous decades 
(Segal 1995, Carreiras 2006), which appear still to apply.  These argue that whilst social and 
cultural factors (such as women’s labour market participation and the things which shape 
this) frame the processes and create the background conditions for women’s military 
recruitment, it is transformations within the military which are probably the more direct 
drivers of change.  Policies directly attentive to diversity continue to be significant.  One 
example, looking forward, is the likely effect of the New Employment Model (NEM), which 
amongst other things sets out to address issues of geographical mobility for service personnel.  
This may have a direct effect in consolidating the increase in women personnel because 
although reduced frequency of moves anticipated under the NEM will affect different groups 
of personnel in different ways, it may be particularly beneficial for women wishing to 
combine a military career with family life, including life partnerships with other serving 
personnel.   
The other example, looking forward, which may have an effect is the likely lifting of the 
regulations excluding women from direct combat posts.  At time of writing, this is under 
review and has yet to be formally confirmed by the Ministry of Defence, although there are 
many positive indications that this will happen (MOD, 2014b).  The lifting of the combat 
exclusion policy will be of far greater symbolic importance than anything else, given that it 
demonstrates quite clearly a de-coupling of a link between military capability and the 
masculine.  It is unlikely that there will be any sudden and pronounced influx of women into 
the Infantry, RAF Regiment or Royal Marines General Service.  This is because of the 
requirements of physical selection, which although they control for gender difference are still 
rigorous to a degree that there will be relatively few women with the physiological 
capabilities to reach the levels of fitness required.  It is also likely that these careers will be 
less appealing to large numbers of young women recruits because of the nature of the work 
involved, judging on the basis of experience of other units, particularly, as we show above, 
the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery.  Furthermore, as one interviewee (a Major working 
in Army recruitment) put it to one of us many years ago, in her experience, the last thing 
wanted by the bright, capable, robust women that she encountered as a recruiter was what 
they perceived as the tedious work of, for example, patrolling associated with the Infantry; 
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they were after something else entirely.11   At the same time, the lifting of the combat 
exclusion may change impressions of the military as an institution founded on principles of 
sexist discrimination.  At present, with the combat exclusion in place, the armed forces sit at 
odds with all other public sector employers and with long-term developments in wider labour 
markets, which have accepted and promoted the principle of equity in employment for all 
without regard to gender difference.  In being able to argue for military exceptionalism – 
exemption from national and European legislation on gender equity in employment – the 
armed forces come to be imagined in particular ways in the public mind:  as the last bastion 
of a set of traditional masculinist values.  In sum, the lifting of the combat exclusion may be 
symbolic, but that symbolic change may have wider effects on perceptions of the armed 
forces as offering suitable career opportunities for appropriately-qualified young women.   
The second observation that we have about why, exactly, close attention to the proportions 
that lie behind the 10% statistic is necessary, is that policy-makers and analysts need to be 
alert to the unintended consequences for gender equity policies which are not ostensibly 
about gender.  We have already speculated how, for example, a small-scale scheme aimed at 
attracting primarily undergraduates on engineering degree programmes to military careers 
(DTUS) may be responsible for relatively large proportion of women in the RE at officer 
level.  More significant is the expansion of the reserves under the Future Force 2020 
programme.  Existing patterns shown above indicate that the proportion of women in the 
Reserves across the three services is much higher than for regular personnel.  On the basis of 
the data available to us, we cannot establish with any certainty whether rates of increase in 
the proportion of women in the Reserves over the past decade or so are higher than in the 
Regular armed forces, but this is a possibility.  It is also not possible to predict at this point in 
time how exactly the changes proposed under the Future Force 2020 programme (and 
particularly Army 2020) will play out in terms of the gendering of the military labour market, 
including continuation of this trend.12  What does seem evident, though, is the effect of this 
policy shift in, potentially, 'feminising’ the British military labour force.  Again, we would 
                                                          
11 Research interview, Gendered Bodies, Personnel Policies and the Culture of the British Army.  ESRC research 
project, R000223562 Rachel Woodward and Trish Winter, Newcastle University, UK, 2001-02. 
12 This and other issues are currently under research through Keeping enough in Reserve: the employment of 
hybrid citizen-soldiers and the Future Reserves 2020 programme. ESRC research project, ES/L012944/1.  Rachel 
Woodward, Tim Edmunds, Paul Higate, John Hockey and K. Neil Jenkings, 2014-17.  This project is one of four 
which constitute Future Reserves Research Programme funded by the ESRC in collaboration with the MoD and 
British Army, which is exploring a wide range of Reserves issues under Future Force 2020; see 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/news-and-events/press-releases/31573/what-is-the-future-of-reservists-in-the-armed-
forces.aspx. 
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argue that looking at the close detail of patterns of gender participation at arm or corps level 
can inform policy strategies aimed at enhancing diversity. 
Our final observation concerns the research agendas for feminist academic analyses that our 
findings suggest.  We noted in our introduction that the issue of women’s military 
participation as a matter of labour matters to those interested in whether women’s military 
participation represents progress towards feminist goals or the co-option of feminism by 
military institutions.  We also noted how paying close attention to the detail of where, 
exactly, women are employed is contributory to that discussion by negating the idea that ‘the 
military’ is somehow monolithic.  Two research agendas follow from this.  One is about the 
generation and analysis of quantitative and qualitative data from primary and secondary 
sources which may explain some of the patterns identified here.  These include the stasis or 
fall in women’s participation in combat support roles (such as signals, intelligence and 
logistics), and the likely causes and consequences of the greater proportion of women in 
Reserves roles, including attendance to the future direction of travel here.  The other research 
agenda concerns feminist debates on women, peace and security, the changing operational 
environment of western militaries, and potential military transformations.  As we note 
elsewhere (Duncanson and Woodward 2016) in the context of analysing the extent to which 
women’s military participation represents progress for feminism, it is insufficient to argue 
that the participation of military women may lead to transformations in military culture and 
structures.  The questions are whether, where, when and how that happens.  Cracking the 
seemingly monolithic notion of ‘the military’ to look at the nuance and detail around 
women’s military participation is an important first step here.   
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Table 1: Percentage of women employed across the three armed forces, 2010-2014. 
 
 1 Apr 2010 1 Apr 2011 1 April 2012 1 Apr 2013 1 Apr 2014 
All services 9.6 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.9 
Officers 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.6 12.7 
Other Ranks 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.3 
      
Naval 
Service 
9.6 9.4 9.2 9.1 9.1 
Officers 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.9 10.0 
Other Ranks 9.6 9.3 9.1 8.8 8.8 
      
Army 7.9 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.7 
Officers 11.3 11.6 11.6 11.8 11.8 
Other Ranks 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.9 8.2 
      
Royal Air 
Force 
13.7 13.8 13.8 13.9 13.8 
Officers 15.4 15.9 15.9 16.3 16.5 
Other Ranks 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.2 13.0 
 
Source: UK Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report, Ministry of Defence, 1st April 2014. 
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Table 2 Percentage of men and women working in occupation groups, UK labour force, 
April to June 2013 
 Men Women 
Managers and senior officials 66.9 33.1 
Professional occupations 50.3 49.7 
Associate professional and technical occupations 57.4 42.6 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 23.4 76.6 
Skilled trades occupations 90.0 10.0 
Caring, leisure and other service occupations 18.0 82.0 
Sales and other customer service occupations 37.3 62.7 
Process, plant and machine operatives 88.6 11.4 
Elementary occupations 54.3 45.7 
Source: Labour Force Survey household datasets, from ONS (2013a) 
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Table 3: British Army, percentage of women by Arm or Corps, 1998 - 2013 
ArmCorp 1998 2003 2008 2013 
Staff 1.4 2.5 2.4 5.6 
Royal Artillery (RA) 3.8 4.8 5.9 7.7 
Royal Engineers (RE) 0.1 0.6 1.3 1.6 
Royal Signals 10.3 10.5 9.6 9.0 
Army Air Corps (AAC) 2.4 3.0 3.9 4.9 
Royal Logistics Corps (RLC) 12.5 11.5 11.2 12.4 
Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) 19.2 26.1 30.2 29.9 
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 
(REME) 
2.2 2.9 3.6 4.1 
AGC (Adjutant Generals Corp) 24.5 28.0 31.5 32.7 
Royal Army Veterinary Corps (RAVC) 20.0 29.4 25.9 30.7 
Royal Army Dental Corps (RADC) 42.8 51.6 52.6 63.8 
Intelligence Corps 22.2 19.8 16.7 17.0 
Royal Army Physical Training Corps (RAPTC) 8.3 7.5 6.6 6.9 
QARANC 74.2 70.4 67.0 65.6 
Corps of Army Music 4.4 9.1 13.7 20.5 
General list / officer designate 15.6 18.7 11.1 14.7 
Source: Defence Statistics (Tri Service).13   
                                                          
13 Percentages calculated on basis of totals derived from original data provided by Defence Statistics (Tri 
Service).  Figures include trained and untrained personnel, and exclude Full Time Reserve Service Personnel 
and mobilised reservists.  All numbers in the original dataset have been rounded to the nearest 10 to limit 
disclosure and ensure confidentiality, and in the original data numbers ending in “5” were rounded to the 
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nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias.  The order in which Arms and Corps appear in Table 2 is the 
order in which they appear in the original dataset. 
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Table 4: Royal Artillery, percentage of women by rank, 1998-2013.   
Royal 
Artillery 
1998 2003 2008 2013 
 
OF4  Lt Col - - - - 
OF3  Major - - 4.4 7.1 
OF2  
Captain 
2.7 5.4 9.7 12.6 
OF1  
Subalterns*14 
5.2 17.6 19.3 13.8 
OR9 WO1  - - - - 
OR8 WO2 - - - 2.3 
OR7 SSgt - - - 3.5 
OR6 
Sergeant 
- - 2.0 5.3 
OR4 
Corporal 
0.7 2.5 6.7 4.9 
OR3 LCpl 2.0 6.5 6.5 6.0 
OR2 Private 8.7 8.2 6.9 9.9 
Source:  Defence Statistics (Tri Service)15 
  
                                                          
14 The data for 2008 and 2013 aggregated Lieutenants and 2nd Lieutenants as Subalterns, a category we have 
reproduced here.  The data for 1998 and 2003 listed each of these separately, but we have continued to 
aggregate them together in order to show trends.  In summing the two categories, we have not been able to 
account for the effects of rounding for each of the individual categories in the original dataset.   
15 For technical details on the data, see footnote to Table 3.   
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Table 5: Royal Engineers, percentage of women by rank, 1998-2013 
Royal Engineers 1998 2003 2008 2013 
OF4  Lt Colonel -  - - - 
OF3  Major - - 4.5 8.1 
OF2  Captain 2.7 4.7 10.9 9.1 
OF1  Subalterns* - 17.6 12.5 14.0 
OR9  WO1 - - - - 
OR8  WO2 - - - - 
OR7  Staff Sergeant - - - - 
OR6  Sergeant - - - - 
OR4  Corporal - - - - 
OR3  Lance Corporal - - 0.7 0.7 
OR2  Private - 0.3 0.8 1.1 
Source: Defence Statistics (Tri Service)16 
  
                                                          
16 For technical details on the data, see footnote to Table 3.   
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Table 6: Territorial Army (Group A) trained personnel by gender and rank, 1 April 
2013. 
Rank Men (n) Women (n) Total (n) Women (%) 
OF6  Brigadier 10 - 10 - 
OF5  Colonel 70 10 80 12.9 
OF4  Lt Col 280 60 350 18.1 
OF3  Major 1 310 260 1 580 16.6 
OF2  Captain 1 120 300 1 420 21.2 
OF1  Subaltern 290 80 370 20.7 
OR9  WO1 200 10 210 5.7 
OR8  WO2 1 020 60 1 080 5.3 
OR7  S. 
Sergeant 
1 050 120 1 170 9.9 
OR6  Sergeant 1 650 230 1 880 12.3 
OR4  Corporal 2 280 410 2 690 15.2 
OR3  L. 
Corporal 
2 760 540 3 300 16.2 
OR2  Private 4 580 500 5 080 9.8 
Total 16 600 2 580 19 230  13.4 
Source: Defence Statistics (Tri Service)17 
  
                                                          
17 The data was classified by Defence Statistics as ‘Territorial Army’ rather than Army Reserve at point of 
delivery.  Group A TA personnel can be deployed.  Group B (Officer Training Corps cadets attending UK 
universities) cannot. 
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Table 7 Royal Air Force, percentage of women Officers by branch, trained, 2004 
Branch % women 
GD 3.9 
Flying 3.4 
Operations Support (OPS SPT) 19.8 
Ground Based Operations (GBO) 19.0 
Total 12.0 
Source:  Defence Statistics (Tri Service) 
Table 8  Royal Air Force, percentage of women Officers by branch, trained, 2009   
Branch % women 
GD 4.8 
Flying 4.4 
OPS SPT 22.8 
GBO 24.4 
Total 14.8 
Non Commissioned Aircrew 3.3 
Source: DASA (AIR) Publications DASA Stat 143, 18th June 2009. 
Table 9  Royal Air Force, percentage of women Officers by branch, trained, 2013   
Branch % women 
Flying 3.8 
Ground 20.6 
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Specialist 35.8 
Total 16.2 
Non Commissioned Aircrew 5.1 
Source:  Defence Statistics (Air) Publications, 1st April 2013.   
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Table 10 Royal Air Force, percentage of women in each Trade Group, Other Ranks, 
trained, 2004-2013 
Trade Group 2004 2009 2013 
1  Aircraft maintenance mechanic 3.1 3.6 3.8 
2   2.8 n/a n/a 
3 2.8 n/a n/a 
4   Information and communication technician n/a 10.4 8.6 
5   General technician 1.8 1.9 2.7 
6   Logistics driver 9.4 11.9 10.6 
8   RAF Regiment  4.1 4.3 5.2 
9   Flight operations assistant 25.4 26.8 24.7 
10 Physical training instructor 6.8 12.0 13.3 
11 Intelligence analyst 26.4 21.3 20.8 
12 Aerospace systems operator 14.3 16.1 15.6 
13 Survival equipment fitter 9.9 10.7 10.3 
14 Photographer 15.2 20.8 20.0 
15 Medical 60.4 61.6 60.1 
16 Dental 81.2 81.2 85.7 
17 Personnel support 37.5 42.5 47.9 
18 Logistics mover and supplier 14.1 14.5 13.2 
19 Logistics catering and chef 30.9 31.5 33.3 
21 Musician 23.6 37.5 35.2 
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Total 11.8 13.2 13.4 
Source:  Defence Statistics (Tri Service) for 2004, DASA (AIR) Publications DASA Stat 
143; 18th June 2009; Defence Statistics (Air) Publications, 1st April 2013.  Note that the 
categories ‘TG2’ and ‘TG3’ are used for 2004 only.   
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Table 11  Royal Air Force, percentage of women by rank, 2004 - 2013 
 2004 2009 2013 
OF5  Group Captain 2.7 6.0 6.6 
OF4  Wing Commander 5.4 6.7 7.7 
OF3  Squadron Leader 8.5 12.8 17.6 
OF2  Flight Lieutenant 15.0 18.3 18.5 
OF1  Flying Officer 28.0 31.4 21.7 
OF (D) PO / APO 25 33.3 50.0 
Total officers 11.9 14.8 16.2 
OR9  WO1 2.1 3.3 5.1 
OR7  Flight Sergeant 5.3 5.8 8.9 
OR7 Chief Technician 0.5 1.6 2.0 
OR6  Sergeant 7.16 10.9 13.8 
OR4  Corporal 11.8 15.5 16.8 
OR3  Senior Aircraftman (T)  / junior 
technician (2013) 
6.6 6.2 5.3 
OR2 Senior Aircraftman  16.7 15.5 18.9 
OR2 LAC/AC 20.7 13.4 6.8 
Total Other Ranks 11.3 13.0 13.4 
Source:  Defence Statistics (Tri Service) for 2004, DASA (AIR) Publications DASA Stat 
143; 18th June 2009; Defence Statistics (Air) Publications, 1st April 2013.   
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Table 12: Naval Service, percentage of women Officers by branch, 2003 - 2013 
 2003 
(trained and 
untrained) 
2010  
(trained) 
2010 
(untrained) 
2013  
(trained) 
2013 
(untrained) 
Warfare 6.1 7 13 8 10 
Engineer 4.7 7 8 8 8 
Logistics 21.3 29 24 24 35 
Medical 15.7 17 36 20 30 
Medical 
services 
ND 12 - 10 - 
Dental 30.7 40 67 44 50 
QARNNS 68.7 67 - 64 - 
Source:  2003: Defence Statistics (Tri Service) 1st April 2003.  2010:  Royal Naval Gender 
Personnel Situation Report, Defence Analytical Services and Advice, 1st September 2010.  
2013: Naval Service Quarterly Gender Personnel Situation Report, Defence Statistics (Navy), 
1st April 2013.  Figures for 2003 calculated from combined data, trained and untrained, 
reflecting the original data source.  Percentages calculated by sum of men and women rather 
than given figure in original data set which reflects rounding.   
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Table 13 Naval Service, percentage of women Ratings by branch, 2003 - 2013 
 2003 
(trained 
and 
untrained) 
2010 
(trained) 
2010 
(untrained) 
2013 
(trained) 
2013 
(untrained) 
Warfare XR 13 15 13 13 8 
Warfare AV 5.1 9 Included 
above 
8 11 
Engineer 
General 
2.9 5 8 4 4 
Engineer 
Aviation 
5.1 6 Included 
above 
6 5 
Logistics 
 
28.0 27 24 27 22 
Medical 
 
40.5 45 36 45 49 
QARNNS 80.9 Included 
above 
nd Included 
above 
Included 
above 
RM Band nd 21 - 23 32 
Total nd 10 13 9 7 
Source: 2003: Defence Statistics (Tri Service) 1st April 2003.  2010:  Royal Naval Gender 
Personnel Situation Report, Defence Analytical Services and Advice, 1st September 2010.  
2013: Naval Service Quarterly Gender Personnel Situation Report, Defence Statistics (Navy), 
1st April 2013.   
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Table 14  Naval Service, percentage of women by rank, 2009 - 2013 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2013 
MR 
OF5  Captain 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 - 
OF4  Commander 3.1 2.6 3.0 3.2 4.2 10.8 
OF3  Lieutenant Commander 8.3 8.5 8.7 9.1 9.3 16.3 
OF2  Lieutenant 13.5 14.0 13.9 13.6 13.7 18.7 
OF1  Sub-Lieutenant 9.8 6.7 10.6 9.5 4.8 - 
 
Total Officers 
 
9.0 
 
 
9.2 
 
9.3 
 
9.4 
 
9.6 
 
nd 
OR9  WO1 3.1 3.8 3.9 4.2 3.9 - 
OR8  WO2 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 - 
OR7  Chief Petty Officer 4.1 4.5 4.9 5.2 5.4 8.1 
OR6  Petty Officer 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 14.6 
OR4  Leading Rate 11.1 11.3 11.7 12.0 12.0 21.2 
OR2  Able Rating 12.9 12.7 11.7 10.9 10.5 15.6 
 
Total Ratings 
 
9.5 
 
9.6 
 
9.4 
 
9.1 
 
9.0 
 
 
nd 
Source:  2003: Defence Statistics (Tri Service) 1st April 2003.  2010:  Royal Naval Gender 
Personnel Situation Report, Defence Analytical Services and Advice, 1st September 2010.  
2013: Naval Service Quarterly Gender Personnel Situation Report, Defence Statistics (Navy), 
1st April 2013.   
